Posts Tagged ‘Eric Goldman’

ZAGG v. Catanach Reminder of What’s at Stake When You Click “Publish”

Friday, October 5th, 2012

Bloggers Anthony H. Catanach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz (Photos: Grumpy Old Accountants)

Two business school professors who author the Grumpy Old Accountants blog have lost a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss against ZAGG, a publicly traded corporation selling mobile phone accessories.

 

The case is ZAGG, Inc. v. Catanach (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012). The full opinion is available as a pdf. I will publish an extended excerpt later today.

Though this is a federal court in Philadelphia, it applied Utah defamation law.

Eric Goldman analyzes the case on his Technology & Marketing Law Blog. He notes that the professors still might win in the long run. But, he says:

[T]his case is a potent reminder that we as bloggers are betting our house with each blog post we make – and where we disseminate “negative” information that gores someone’s ox, the wounded ox just might gore us back. It’s one of the reasons why, after 2,000+ blog posts over nearly 8 years, my fingers still tremble a bit when I hit “publish” on a blog post that trashes a real live company or person. You as the readers tend to enjoy the bloodsport, but it’s only fun and games until someone gets sued.

Arbitrations and the Corporate Litigants Who Love Them

Tuesday, September 11th, 2012

Tim Cushing at Techdirt picked up on the post I did on the Barnes & Noble case (where I, in turn, was picking up on the post Venkat Balasubramani did on Eric Goldman’s Technology & Marketing Law Blog).

In my post, I tried to explain why arbitration is such a great deal for corporations. For various reasons I didn’t dwell on the question of whether corporations get better-than-fair treatment in the arbitration itself. But they do. Much better.

Cushing picked up where I left off by citing to a Seattle Post Intelligencer article reporting the results of a Public Citizen study finding that corporations beat consumers about 95 percent of the time in arbitration.

The Public Citizen study the PI was talking about appears to be this one: The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers [pdf].

The details are interesting. The key statistic in the study is actually 94 percent – that’s the winning rate for corporations in the cases handled in California by the private arbitration service provider called the National Arbitration Forum. (California formed the sample pool because California, unlike other states, requires public reporting of some limited data by arbitrators.)

The 95 percent figure is for just a small group of specific 28 arbitrators. But it’s that elite group that gets almost all the work!

The Busiest Arbitrators Produce the Results Corporations Seek: In California, a small, busy cadre of 28 arbitrators handled nearly 9 out of every 10 NAF cases. This group ruled for businesses 95 percent of the time. Another 120 arbitrators handled slightly more than 10 percent of the cases in which an arbitrator was assigned. They ruled for businesses 86 percent of the time and for consumers 10 percent.

Can you imagine what it would be like if, instead of judges getting their salary from the government, they were paid by litigants. And can you imagine if there were different court systems competing with one another, all vying for the repeat business of litigants who constantly find themselves being sued? Well, you don’t have to imagine it: That’s arbitration.

As a corporate user of arbitration, you pick the arbitration firm upfront by selecting it in the terms of service or credit-card holder agreement. Of course, you are going to pick the firm that gives you good results. And since arbitration firms are competing for the loyalty of corporate customers, they are going to pick the arbitrators that give those corporate customers what they want. That’s not something dirty for the corporation to do, mind you. That’s just a general counsel doing her or his job. But it sure creates incentives that are skewed.

The report explains:

Arbitrators have a strong financial incentive to rule in favor of the companies that file cases against consumers because they can make hundreds of thousands of dollars a year conducting arbitrations. The arbitrators are chosen by the arbitration firms hired by MBNA and other corporations, which are unlikely to pick arbitration firms that produce results they do not like. Arbitrators routinely charge $400 or more an hour. Top arbitrators can charge up to $10,000 per day and some make $1 million a year. In comparison, California Superior Court judges earn $171,648.

(Yeah, judges don’t make as much. But, in fact, the judgeship is a great stepping stone to being an arbitrator.)

The Public Citizen report explains how systemic bias can develop:

A Race to the Bottom for Arbitration Firms: Companies track how arbitrators rule, and do not choose arbitrators who do not rule in their favor. One NAF arbitrator, a Harvard law professor, was blackballed after she awarded $48,000 to a consumer in a case in which a credit card company filed a claim against the consumer. After the same credit card company had her removed from other pending cases, she resigned, citing NAF’s “apparent systematic bias in favor of the financial services industry.”

Hey, do you get the feeling that Harvard law professor they might have been talking about was Elizabeth Warren? Yeah, me too! Warren was thanked in the acknowledgments section, but it’s just as likely she was their source for information about a different Harvard law professor. (Harvard does have a huge faculty.)

Barnes & Noble Loses in Court for Lack of Notice on Terms of Service

Wednesday, September 5th, 2012

Barnes & Noble logoVenkat Balasubramani over at Eric Goldman’s Technology & Marketing Law Blog talks about a defeat for online retailer Barnes & Noble in their attempt to enforce a terms-of-service arbitration clause.

The case is interesting to any bloggers wondering what they can and can’t get away with by linking to a page of “Terms of Service.”

The plaintiff in Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble 12-cv-0812-JST (RNBx) (C.D. Cal.; Aug. 28, 2012) sued because after he purchased two HP TouchPad tablet computers at a price he was happy with, Barnes & Noble e-mailed him saying they had cancelled the order.

Before getting to the merits – whether Nguyen be able to get his tablets at the price at which he allegedly purchased them (and of course he should!) – B&N moved to enforce an arbitration clause in the B&N terms of service.

An arbitration clause allows a party – generally a huge corporation – to prevent a plaintiff – usually a consumer – from being able to litigate in court and get a trial by jury. Instead, the case goes to arbitration, where one or more arbitrators decide the case wholly outside the court system.

Corporations love arbitration in consumer disputes because arbitration alleviates the possibility of huge jury verdicts. It also can force plaintiffs to withdraw from the fight, because in the typical arbitration, both sides must pay the arbitrators fees, which can be too steep for a consumer to bear (in the thousands of dollars), especially when the potential recovery from an arbitration is likely to be low (maybe just in the hundreds or even less in a typical consumer dispute). Corporations also love arbitration because it prevents class-action litigation, which makes it economical to sue companies for having ripped off large numbers of people where any given individual’s loss was small. (It will come as no surprise that Nguyen’s suit was brought in a such a way that it could have blossomed into a large class action if the facts warranted.)

So B&N lost its bid to put Nguyen’s case into arbitration. Why? B&N couldn’t show that Nguyen had notice of the terms.

B&N buried the arbitration clause in terms of service that were linked to at the bottom of the bn.com pages. B&N could have had a pop-up “I agree” window or even just a box that Nguyen had to check saying he agreed to and had read the terms of service. They also could have written on the checkout screen about the transaction was subject to terms of service. But they didn’t do any of that. So, as a result, it looks like Nguyen will get his day in court.

Sounds like a win for consumers, huh? Balasubramani says not so fast:

It’s temping to see this case as a pushback on terms of service that contain arbitration clauses. However, it’s more likely an outlier in the sense that B&N’s terms of service implementation was so shoddy that it’s not likely representative of the typical terms of service case. If B&N had provided ample notice, the court would have probably enforced the terms and, as in the Slide and Zynga cases, required the consumer to arbitrate his claims.

Balasubramani sarcastically calls Nguyen’s claim “a tragic and sad story,” but says, “It’s tough to have much sympathy for B&N here … there’s zero excuse for not requiring the consumer to check the box and indicate assent to the terms as a condition of completing the transaction.”

Well, I think it’s hard to feel much sympathy for Barnes & Noble for the simple reason that they ripped Nguyen off. I say, give the man his tablets at the price he bought them! Barnes & Noble even sent an e-mail confirming the order … before they cancelled it. B&N has seller’s regret. Too bad. A deal’s a deal, I say. Cough up the tablets.

Unfortunately, you can bet Barnes & Noble will get their terms-of-service assent right next time.

Big online retailers like Barnes & Noble, eBay, and Amazon have consumer reviews and ratings to help consumers avoid getting ripped off when buying unfamiliar products or purchasing from a third-party seller. That’s great – ratings and reviews have been a positive innovation for consumers.

But clickwrap arbitration clauses have been a bad technological development for consumers. The portal entities – such as Barnes & Noble, eBay, and Amazon – have privileged positions in a not-so-competitive marketplace. There are few players, making choice limited. Consumers ought to be able to take these online companies to court when warranted. Unfortunately, the twin innovations of clickwrap agreements and arbitration clauses all too often make big corporate online players answerable to no one.

 

Likes, Takedowns, and Server Seizures – Great Posts from Goldman’s Blog

Monday, May 7th, 2012

Eric Goldman

Here’s just some of the required reading coming off of Eric Goldman’s Technology and Law Marketing Blog:

Facebook “Likes” Aren’t Speech Protected By the First Amendment–Bland v. Roberts

This is a case where a sheriff fired sheriff’s department workers after they Facebook-liked the sheriff’s opponent in an upcoming bid for re-election. Venkat Balasubramani and Eric G. explain why the court’s wrong that liking someone on FB isn’t protected First Amendment speech. I agree, of course. It’s a baffling decision.

512(f) Plaintiff Can’t Get Discovery to Back Up His Allegations of Bogus Takedowns–Ouellette v. Viacom

This is exactly the kind of thing your civil procedure professor was talking about when they said “procedure is substance.” Big Hollywood is free to machine-gun takedown notices out there, and despite a substantive legal right to get redress for such bogus takedowns, the procedural requirements make the right nearly worthless, turning §512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act into something quite different than what you would think it is just by reading it.

As Eric G. notes, “unless the 512(f) plaintiff has smoking-gun evidence of the copyright owner’s bad intent before filing the complaint, the plaintiff has virtually no chance of getting a 512(f) claim into discovery.”

Comments on the Megaupload Prosecution (a Long-Delayed Linkwrap)

The Megaupload case is one of those things that is extremely troubling, but it can be hard to explain exactly why it’s troubling in a pithy way. But here’s a quote from Eric G. that does a pretty good job:

The government is using its enforcement powers to accomplish what most copyright owners haven’t been willing to do in civil court (i.e., sue Megaupload for infringement); and the government is doing so by using its incredibly powerful discovery and enforcement tools that vastly exceed the tools available in civil enforcement; and the government’s bringing the prosecution in part because of the revolving door between government and the content industry (where some of the decision-makers green-lighting the enforcement action probably worked shoulder-to-shoulder with the copyright owners making the request) plus the Obama administration’s desire to curry continued favor and campaign contributions from well-heeled sources.

The resulting prosecution is a depressing display of abuse of government authority. It’s hard to comprehensively catalog all of the lawless aspects of the US government’s prosecution of Megaupload …

Megaupload’s website is analogous to a printing press that constantly published new content. Under our Constitution, the government can’t simply shut down a printing press, but that’s basically what our government did when it turned Megaupload off and seized all of the assets. Not surprisingly, shutting down a printing press suppresses countless legitimate content publications by legitimate users of Megaupload. Surprisingly (shockingly, even), the government apparently doesn’t care about this “collateral,” entirely foreseeable and deeply unconstitutional effect.

What do these three recent developments all have in common? Big guys win, little guys lose. Sometimes law is very dispiriting.

Social Media Gotchas in Court – Plus: Professor Goldman’s Innovation Giveaway

Friday, January 6th, 2012

refrigeratorProfessor Eric Goldman has been keeping a list of cases in which a person’s social media has been used as evidence against them, or, as he puts it, when litigants say “one thing in court and another when talking to their friends online.”

In the latest case, a workers comp claimant, who says he is in excruciating pain after a refrigerator fell on him, put pictures on Facebook and MySpace that show him drinking and partying. To try to get the photos excluded from evidence, the claimant attempted to seize the moral high ground, arguing that the use of the pictures in litigation was “a disgrace to the dignity of the workers’ compensation proceedings and the legal system.”

Nice try.

The court allowed the evidence.

Confronted with this case, Goldman offers the following:

Now that Facebook can do facial recognition, it should next develop a tool to automatically detect photos depicting alcoholic drinks and give users a way to automatically opt-out of those photos!

Goldman’s quite a guy, huh? Instead of trying to grab some quick cash by applying for a software/business-method patent on this, he’s offered it up as a public service. Someone note this down so that Goldman’s post can be used as prior art to block patent-hungry Facebook if and when they apply for a patent on “Method of Shielding Workers Comp Claimants from Impeaching Photos of Boozing”.

Here’s the full list of social-media-evidence-gotcha cases Professor Goldman has collected:

Unfounded Allayances for a Misarchitected Law

Tuesday, October 25th, 2011

Huge pile of building rubbleMisarchitected.
(Photo: EEJ)

Over at Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Eric Goldman has written that the just-enacted California Reader Privacy Act may impose a new burden on individual bloggers who are on the receiving end of subpoenas. Paul Alan Levy, a lawyer with Public Citizen, a leading public-interest law firm, doesn’t agree. Levy says that the phrase “commercial entity” in the bill could not be construed to cover individuals because, individuals can’t be “entities.”

In this post, I’m going to take issue with what Levy says, and I’m going to offer some things to bolster Goldman’s critique.

Let me note at the outset that Levy is a heavy-hitting litigator who fights the good fight. He’s on the right side of battle after battle, doing pro bono impact litigation that makes our world a better place. So, I’m certainly not at odds with Levy in the greater scheme of things. But I do think that Goldman points out a serious flaw in California’s new privacy law, one that is bad for bloggers, and one that’s worth dwelling on for a bit.

Also, I’m a California litigator. I’ve spent a lot of time puzzling over California statutes. I’ve come to believe that California statutory law needs some watchdogging. So I offer my comments in that vein.

Here’s Levy’s argument that the statute won’t apply to individual bloggers:

… Professor Goldman ignores the limiting impact of the word “entity.” An individual is not an entity; rather, an entity is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as an organization whose identity is separate from its members.

First, while a dictionary can be helpful resource for readers stumbling across unfamiliar legal words, it is not, at least in my view, a particularly persuasive foundation for interpreting a statute. Regardless, however, I don’t think the definition that Levy cites excludes natural persons. If you look at the whole definition, it clearly says that an entity can have a separate legal existence from its members, but the definition doesn’t say that a natural person can’t be an entity.

At any rate, dictionary definitions are really beside the point. The fact is, there’s a plentitude of legal precedents considering “entity” to embrace an individual person. For instance, many statutory schemes explicitly define “entity” to embrace an individuals. One prominent example is the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See, 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).

Moreover, courts have plainly used the word “entity” to refer to an individual person. In discussing what the word “individual” meant, for instance, New York’s high court held, “An individual is one entity, one distinct being, a single one, and when spoken of the human kind means one man or one woman.” People v. Doty, 35 Sickels 225, 1880 WL 12385 (N.Y. 1880).

In defining “sole proprietorship,” a D.C. court used the word “entity,” saying, “A sole proprietorship is an entity that is so identified with its owner that the business either must undergo a fundamental change or cease to exist upon the owner’s death or retirement.” Hunter Innovations Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut, 605 F. Supp. 2d 170, 173 (D.D.C. 2009).

Levy makes other arguments, however:

The statute itself confirms this construction, in that it limits any disclosure (voluntary or compelled) to a “government entity,” but limits compelled disclosure to “any person, private entity, or government entity.”

This is a helpful argument, one which I find somewhat persuasive. But it’s not the end of the matter. The fact is, “person” under the law frequently includes such entities as corporations. Often – I would even say most of the time – when the law means an individual human being, and not things such as corporations, the law uses the term “natural person.” In fact, a neighboring section of the California Civil Code, Section 1798.3, says that “‘individual’ means a natural person” and “‘person’ means any natural person, corporation,partnership, limited liability company, firm, or association.” If “person” includes “corporation,” that arguably makes the term “private entity” redundant of “person,” except that ”person” might embrace a public corporation (i.e., a corporation with publicly traded shares), whereas, perhaps, “private entity” would not.

All of this going around in circles, of course, just illustrates that this statute is poorly drafted. It’s another home run by the folks in the California Legislature. I wish someone would come up with a ballot initiative to force the California Legislature to employ a huge army of well-paid staff to draft and analyze legislative language. It would be worth every penny. The alternative is half-baked text or the made-to-order work product of lobbyists. (Although, with the ACLU, EFF, and (ahem) Google lobbying for this, you’d think made-to-order language would have been pretty good.)

Okay, let’s go on to Levy’s next argument:

A similar understanding that an individual is not an entity is shown by the fact that “government entity” is defined to include any “state or local agency” or “any individual acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of a state or local agency.” If “government entity” included individuals, this last clause would not be needed[.]

Hmmm. I get exactly the opposite out of that. By including individuals within the term “government entity,” the legislature, it seems to me, shows that it understands individual persons to qualify as a kind of entity.

Levy’s bottom line:

So the individual blogger is plainly off the hook as a “commercial entity.” A corporation that blogs, yes. A partnership blogs, yes. But not an individual.

I very much disagree with the phrase “plainly off the hook.” I’d go with “arguably.” Levy makes a fine argument. But, in my mind, that’s all it is: an argument. Take it from me – a member of the California bar who has spent approximately eleventeen bazillion billable hours researching and briefing issues of California statutory interpretation: This is not an easily-disposed-of issue.

But while we are on the subject of phraseology, I note that Goldman’s word for describing the new statute is “misarchitected” – a word which, technically speaking, doesn’t seem to exist. That’s not a knock on Goldman. To the contrary, as I’ve pointed out before, I think it’s part of the job of a law professor to use big words and to even make up new words. Every once in a while, I slip a big, nonexistent word by law-review editors. And count me on board with this one. I’m already thinking about how I can stick misarchitected into one of my working manuscripts.

In the meantime, when it comes to the Reader Privacy Act, I simply do not find Levy’s allayances persuasive. Thus, I must offer the California Legislature my regretulations on a job not-super-well-done.

Later this week, I’ll explain my biggest problem with the Reader Privacy Act.

More from me:

Yikes! Is My Blog Regulated By California’s Reader Privacy Act? Is Yours?

Monday, October 24th, 2011

Looking up at the California capitol dome on a sunny day
The California Capitol. (Photo: EEJ)

Well, this is terrifying.

Eric Goldman, in a new blog post, hypothesizes that California’s newly enacted Reader Privacy Act could be read to impose statutory requirements on bloggers. The law requires “book services” to give notice to persons who are the target of a personal-information-seeking subpoena served on the book service. In other words, if someone throws a subpoena at an online book service in order to find out what books someone is reading, the book service has to first reach out to that someone before turning over the information.

So far, that doesn’t sound too bad.

But where Professor Goldman gets alarmed … (Let me just pause to note that while I would feel comfortable calling Eric Goldman by his first name, if I start saying “Eric argues” or “where Eric gets alarmed” on this blog, people are going to think I’m talking about myself in the third person. And while I’m generally okay with people thinking I’m a bit eccentric, I don’t want people thinking I’ve got the mindset of a marginal presidential candidate who is slowly losing touch with reality.)

So, anyway, as I was saying, where Professor Goldman gets alarmed is in looking carefully at who qualifies as a “book service” and who is therefore is obligated under the new law:

Let’s look closely at who is required to comply with the law — recognizing that the statute has a private cause of action that will be enforced by a rapacious privacy plaintiffs’ bar.

What?!? A “rapacious” plaintiffs’ bar?!? In CALIFORNIA?!?!? I can’t believe that. Anyway, as Goldman was saying …

[C]learly this covers Amazon and other online book retailers. But in this day and age, what is a “book” and, more importantly, what isn’t? The statute defines a book as:

paginated or similarly organized content in printed, audio, electronic, or other format, including fiction, nonfiction, academic, or other works of the type normally published in a volume or finite number of volumes, excluding serial publications such as a magazine or newspaper

… [W]hat about blogs? Are they “book services”? Before you discount the latter, consider that many blogs are, in fact, paginated (at least in the URL–see Blog Law Blog as an example).

Isn’t that awesome? I did a nested double-blockquote! Who knew you could even do that? Hey, wait a minute! That’s ME he’s talking about! AIYEEEAAHHH?!?!? There’s nothing like waking up in the morning and finding out that the California legislature has just done something that might expose you to private plaintiffs’ actions.

But wait, I can actually breathe a sigh of relief, because I’m pretty confident I don’t count as a “commercial entity” under the law. And since I’m not a commercial entity, the law’s requirements don’t apply to me.

But what about you, dear reader? Does your blog have advertisements on it? Even AdSense or Amazon affiliate links could, in Goldman’s view, possibly expose a blogger to “commercial entity” status.

And that’s just one more reason not to have ads on your site. As I said in regards to the question of whether having an ad-bearing blog imposes tax liability (in a post that my WordPress installation faithlessly labeled “page 1075“):

My advice for most bloggers is this: Dump the ads. Why bother putting ads on your blog unless it is going to make you substantial amounts of money? Ads clutter up blogs. They look terrible, and they are often for products that are either ridiculous (like herbal cures) or kindov depressing (like life insurance). That detracts from a user’s experience. And if ads cause you to have legal trouble – and even trying to figure out if you have legal trouble is a kind of legal trouble – then you should flush them down the drain.

I’ll have more to say on California’s Reader Privacy Act in posts this week. I’ll weigh in on the debate between Paul Alan Levy of Public Citizen and Goldman about whether an individual can be an “entity’ under the new act. I’ll also explain my biggest problem with the new law.

Righthaven Recap Recap

Thursday, June 30th, 2011

Eric Goldman, back from Russia, looks to have used jet-lag fueled wakefulness to do a recap of two weeks’ worth of Righthaven rulings on his Technology & Marketing Law Blog. So, if you don’t have time to read all those decisions, Professor Goldman has done you the service of knocking it all down to 1,429 words.

Okay, so if you’re too lazy to read that, here’s my recap of Goldman’s recap:

Righthaven v. Hoehn, 2011 WL 2441020 (D. Nev. June 20, 2011):

Judge Pro followed Judge Hunt’s Democratic Underground ruling in holding that Righthaven lacked standing, and then went on also to say that Hoehn lost on fair use. Goldman is rightly skeptical of some of Judge Pro’s analysis, saying:

Judge Pro’s discussion on the second point (nature of the work) has attracted some criticism, perhaps justifiably so. It’s difficult to say that a 19 paragraph editorial doesn’t have the same level of creativity as other highly creative works. I tend not to obsess about the details of any fair use analysis given its nature as an equitable defense. The judge was twisting the analysis to make it clear Righthaven should lose. Denigrating the editorial’s creativity is an awkward way to get there, but it demonstrates that judges aren’t buying what Righthaven is selling.

Yeah, I think that’s well put. At the end of the day, you can get way too carried away with the fair-use factors. I tell my students that the most important question in fair-use analysis is just, “Does it seem fair?” (But don’t base your brief around that. It tends not to get explicit endorsement in the case law.)

Goldman notes that Righthaven has lost on fair use three times, including two cases now, including Hoehn, where the defendants re-used THE ENTIRE work. Crazy, because that’s often a show-stopper for fair use.

As a jurisprudential corpus, this fair use caselaw is becoming quite defense-favorable.

Yup. Righthaven is doing more to expand the doctrine of fair use than just about anybody in the past few years.

At this rate, if Righthaven keeps it up, they’ll do more to expand fair use than Google. And it’s hard to do anything better than Google. Especially, you would think, when you’re trying not to.

Righthaven v. Barham, 2011 WL 2473602 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011); ?Righthaven v. DiBiase, 2:10-cv-01343-RLH-PAL (D. Nev. June 22, 2011):

The same Judge Hunt who gave Righthaven the smackdown in Democratic Underground on lack of standing does it again here.

Righthaven v. Virginia Citizens Defense League, 2:10-cv-01683-GMN-PAL (D. Nev. June 23, 2011):

Judge Navarro rejects a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on fair use and lack of standing, but notes that the Democratic Underground decision came out after the briefs for Virginia Citizens Defense League were already in. Goldman thinks she’ll get on board eventually:

My guess is that she will be persuaded on summary judgment.

Goldman’s bottom-line assessment:

Righthaven’s business is “in tatters.” Everything’s going wrong for them all at once.

Short of completing a hail mary pass in the Ninth Circuit, there is only one possible endgame for Righthaven, and it won’t be pretty.

Yup. I agree with that too. And I’ll add that your chances of getting an appeals court to come to your aid are likely to drop precipitously when you’ve tried systematically to hoodwink judges at the trial court level by playing fast and loose with the facts.

So, that’s a little over 500 words, recapping a recap of a little over 1,400 words. Have I just showcased what is so liberating about blogging as a literary genre? Or what is so ridiculous about it?

Hmmm. Well, either way, I do feel rest assured that what I just did was thoroughly legal.

Eric Goldman’s Notes from Law & Econ of Search and Ads

Friday, June 24th, 2011

Eric Goldman has posted his notes from the Google-sponsored conference “The Law and Economics of Search Engines and Online Advertising” at the George Mason University School of Law. It includes a lot of insight into Google search, how it works, and why Google make some of the choices it does in formulating search results.

Eric Goldman on Two Personal Jurisdiction Decisions

Friday, May 6th, 2011

Eric Goldman reviews two recent personal-jurisdiction decisions, including Shymatta v. Papillon, 2011 WL 1542145 (D. Idaho April 21, 2011), about which Eric says, “This ruling is nice because it denies jurisdiction not only for normal blogging activities but also ‘enhanced’ blogging activities like putting podcasts behind a paywall.”

Blog Law Way-Back Machine: Goldman in 2006

Wednesday, April 6th, 2011

I don’t know why I never noticed this before, but Eric Goldman at one point gave a talk on blog law, way back in 2006. A pdf of his presentation slides shows that he did a good job of seeing the blog litigation of the future. (At least he was a lot more prescient with blog law than he was when he predicted the failure of Wikipedia by 2010.)

In the Las Vegas Sun: My Take on the Rule 11 Threat Against Righthaven

Wednesday, March 2nd, 2011

Steve Green of the Las Vegas Sun interviewed me about Dana Eiser’s rule 11 motion against Righthaven:

Separately, two law professors who have been critical of Righthaven expressed skepticism about threats by Righthaven defendant Dana Eiser to ask a federal judge in South Carolina to order Righthaven to refund settlement funds from prior lawsuits.

Attorneys for Eiser made the threat Sunday as they challenged Righthaven’s standard lawsuit demand that Eiser forfeit her website domain name to Righthaven.

“I’ve never heard of anything like this, and I can’t imagine how it would work. Eiser’s heart is in the right place. I’d love to see Righthaven have to give back the settlement money, but I don’t know of any legal way of forcing them to do that,” said Eric Johnson, an associate professor of law at the University of North Dakota. “Eiser’s attorneys don’t cite any legal authority supporting their claim – at least in the motion.

“Courts perceive very strong public-policy reasons for not overturning or interfering with settlements, even when they seem very unfair,” Johnson said.

The full article also contains quote from Eric Goldman of Santa Clara University Law School. Neither Professor Goldman nor I see much prospect for success here. But I like the chutzpah.